The reported adjournment sine die of the suit instituted by Nafiu Bala Gombe against the David Mark-led ADC National Working Committee today by the Federal High Court Abuja, raises profound concerns about procedural propriety, judicial independence, and the integrity of accelerated political litigation. This concern becomes even more compelling because the matter had reportedly proceeded substantially to conclusion before Justice Nwite of the Federal High Court pursuant to the accelerated hearing mandate of the Supreme Court, with proceedings already nearing the judgment stage.
It is therefore difficult to reconcile the sudden adjournment sine die and the requested reassignment of the case with established judicial practice, especially where the application for recusal was allegedly made administratively to the Chief Judge rather than formally before the trial court itself. Such a development inevitably provokes legitimate concerns about forum shopping, procedural ambush, and the dangerous precedent that litigants may halt imminent judgments merely by bypassing the courtroom and petitioning judicial administrators.
The established principle of law is that allegations warranting recusal should ordinarily be raised formally before the trial judge whose impartiality is being questioned. A litigant cannot, after participating extensively in proceedings, bypass the judicial process and invoke the administrative powers of the Chief Judge as though the office were an appellate clearing house over pending matters. Such practice, if normalized, would dangerously expose the judiciary to manipulation by dissatisfied litigants seeking to avoid imminent judgments they perceive may not favour them.
The courts have consistently held that allegations of bias sufficient to warrant recusal must be substantial, personal, and based on credible extrajudicial considerations rather than mere dissatisfaction with proceedings or apprehension of adverse outcomes. In *Babarinde v. State (2013) LPELR-21896(SC),* the Supreme Court emphasized that judicial bias alone is insufficient to justify disqualification unless it is personal or founded on credible extrajudicial considerations.
Similar principles were reiterated recently in the rejection of the recusal application brought against Justice Rahman Oshodi of the Lagos State High Court in the criminal trial involving the former Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. Godwin Emefile . In declining the application, the court held that the allegations of bias were speculative, unsupported by credible evidence, and insufficient to disqualify the judge from continuing with the proceedings. The ruling reaffirmed the settled judicial position that recusal cannot be granted merely because a party harbours subjective fears or becomes uncomfortable with the direction of proceedings. Courts have consistently warned that permitting such speculative applications would encourage litigants to engage in judge-shopping and destabilize the administration of justice.
More troubling in the Nafiu Bala Gombe matter is the timing. A recusal request made at the threshold of judgment, particularly in a politically sensitive dispute subject to accelerated hearing, naturally invites public suspicion that the objective may not be the protection of judicial integrity but the frustration or postponement of an impending judicial outcome.
The authority of a Chief Judge to administratively reassign cases must always be exercised cautiously and sparingly, especially where reassignment risks undermining judicial continuity, wasting judicial time already invested, and compromising the constitutional imperative of speedy dispensation of justice. Otherwise, litigants may weaponize petitions and administrative complaints as strategic tools to intimidate judges, derail proceedings, and shop for more favourable forums.
If indeed no substantial constitutional, jurisdictional, or ethical breach had been established against the presiding judge, then the decision to adjourn proceedings sine die on the basis of an ex parte administrative complaint risks setting a dangerous precedent. It could embolden future litigants to sidestep the courtroom and seek administrative intervention whenever proceedings appear headed in an unfavourable direction.
Ultimately, public confidence in the judiciary is better preserved when courts are allowed to conclude matters already substantially heard, leaving dissatisfied parties to pursue constitutionally recognized appellate remedies rather than procedural ambushes at the edge of judgment.
It is therefore my firm believe that the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court would not be unreasonable to use his administrative powers to derail the course of justice, and that Justice Nwite, would decline to recuse himself on a frivolous administrative recusal request and proceed to conclude hearing and deliver judgement on the matter as soon as the Chief Judge acts negatively on the vexatious exparte administrative application.
*Alex Ter Adum, PhD*
DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE
alexadum45@gmail.com
