By Louis Achi
At the risk of sounding jaded, intelligence, intel, typically refers to secret, security, or strategic data gathered about an enemy or a situation. It often implies actionable knowledge used for decision-making in security, business, or competitive contexts. This is the focus of this analysis.
In the aftermath of the recent attack by terrorists on the Nigerian Army Brigade Headquarters in Benisheikh, Borno State governor, Prof. Babagana Zulum, made a startling but sad revelation that the Nigerian Army received intelligence two days before the attack. According to the governor, the intelligence included movement and routes used by the terrorists, and that insurgents were headed towards the military barracks. The governor expressed regret that the Army failed to act.
While Governor Zulum didn’t disclose which of the security agencies supplied the intelligence to the Army, it isn’t difficult to hazard a guess if what Zulum’s colleague in Kebbi State, Alhaji Nasir Idris, said last November is anything to go by.
In mid-November 2025, gunmen attacked Government Girls’ Comprehensive Secondary School, Maga, in Danko/Wasagu Local Government Area of Kebbi State. The gunmen abducted at least 25 female students of the school.
Shortly after the attack, Governor Idris visited the school. During the visit he expressed frustration over the failure to act on credible intelligence provided by the Department of State Services (DSS), which revealed a clandestine plot to attack the school.
Lamented the governor, “This is clear sabotage. We received credible intelligence from the DSS that this school was likely to be attacked. The DSS further advised that we convene an emergency Security Council meeting, which we did. The decision was that we would provide round-the-clock protection for the students.”
He stated that he took the DSS report seriously, bearing in mind that the failure to act on similar intelligence led to the December 2020 kidnapping of over 300 pupils of a school in Kankara, Katsina State.
On November 21, 2025, gunmen attacked St. Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri Community, Agwara Local Government Area of Niger State, abducting over 300 students and teachers. After a month-long captivity, all kidnapped persons were confirmed free on December 21, 2025.
The abduction and rescue of the Papiri victims wasn’t without controversy, especially after it was confirmed that the school authorities defied an intelligence report by the DSS that all boarding schools shut down in the face of the possibility that they could be attacked by terrorists.
A month earlier, the Kogi State governor, Alhaji Usman Ododo, lauded the DSS for what he called their timely and accurate intelligence reports. The governor spoke on the heels of a leaked DSS intelligence report that the state and neighbouring Ondo were likely to come under attack.
Governor Ododo’s Commissioner of Information and Communications, Hon. Kingsley Fanwo, who conveyed the gratitude of the state to the secret police, said Kogi State has always relied on credible intelligence of the Service.
“The report itself is evidence that our security agencies are alive to their responsibilities. We commend the DSS for their vigilance and for providing early intelligence capable of preventing such evil plans from being executed,” stated the Commissioner.
On its part, Ondo state didn’t scoff at a leaked security memo by the DSS, which was addressed to the 32 Artillery Brigade of the Nigerian Army, in Akure.
The secret police, in the leaked memo , said it “confirmed plans by members of the ISWAP terrorist group to carry out coordinated attacks on communities in Ondo and Kogi States anytime soon.”
Further, stated the report: “Some identified target locations within Ondo State include, Eriti Akoko, Oyin Akoko communities in Akoko North West LGA and Owo town in Owo LGA respectively.
“It was further gathered that the groups have commenced surveillance on potential soft targets in the above-mentioned locations.”
On the heels of the same leaked memo on planned attacks by ISWAP elements, the Ondo State Government called for calm among residents of the state.
While describing the memo as “routine intelligence regularly shared among security agencies and government in the state,” the Commissioner for Information and Orientation, Idowu Ajanaku, disclosed that it is used to assess security threats and take proactive measures.
Earlier in May 13, 2025 – exactly one month before the Yelwata massacre in Benue State, a leaked DSS intelligence report revealed that the secret police warned of “coordinated attacks on Tiv settlements” by “suspected armed Fulani mercenaries” across Nasarawa and Benue states. The document, which later surfaced on social media, detailed planned assaults on multiple communities including Yelwata where many Christian farmers would die in a horrific night of violence.
In the leaked memo to the Defence Headquarters, DSS said it got intelligence that the planned attack was to avenge an alleged seizure of some cows by the state government.
The communication identified the communities marked for attack as Mararaba, Jangargari, Wurgi, Gidan Antonny, Akon, Usende, Gaar, Vandikya, Chiata, Dooga, Gidan Baban Yara, Apelle, Pantaki, Kaambe and the Stadium area.
Back to the Benisheikh attack. Governor Zulum’s revelation raises fresh concerns about how early warnings are processed and acted upon within the current counter-insurgency framework under Operation Hadin Kai and other security outfits across the country.
While the exact sequence of operational decisions remains unclear, analysts opine those advance warnings of the nature given by the DSS in Katsina, Niger, Benue, Kogi, Ondo, and very recently, in Borno, are typically intended to support precautionary deployments, surveillance, or other preventive measures.
Granted, it is not always possible to determine with exactitude what actions were taken or were not. However, the unfortunate events that followed leaves much to be desired.
Security observers say the situation reflects a broader, recurring concern in Nigeria’s security landscape, where early warning signals do not always appear to translate into outcomes that prevent catastrophic consequences. However, they are quick to caution that operational constraints, competing priorities, and the complexity of counter-insurgency environments can affect how intelligence is interpreted and acted upon.
The experts opine that Nigeria has made notable progress in intelligence gathering over the years. They, however, argue that there is pressing need for government to enhance capabilities of security agencies to act on the intelligence. For instance, what is the capacity of our over stretched military, to keep protecting areas they long liberated? They deserve pity, as they cannot be everywhere. Our attention should rather be shifted to the police whose primary duty is the protection of life and property. Sadly, our police do not have basic capacity to protect communities liberated by the military. The result is that our military are compelled by the need to tackle fresh insecurity challenges, so abandon already liberated communities.
From reports all over the country, it is clear that the problem in our hands is no longer that of the dearth of intelligence. In fact, we can say that there is abundance of intelligence – from the systematic one by the DSS, the local communities, and even foreign nationals and governments.
Suggestions often advanced include more government support, enhancing community-based intelligence networks, improving inter-agency collaboration, and ensuring clearer frameworks for evaluating and acting on information relating to threats. Needless stressing the police should be properly equipped to be alive to its primary duty of protecting lives and property.
They also stress the importance of accountability systems that review how intelligence is handled, while recognising the need to balance transparency with operational security.
As security agencies continue to confront evolving insurgent tactics, the Benisheikh situation highlights the ongoing challenge of translating early warnings into effective preventive action.
Beyond funding challenges, there is the pressing need to take intelligence reports with more seriousness. After all, there’s nothing wrong with erring on the side of caution. We may have made costly mistakes. We can’t, however, continue to afford to continue to wallow in such mistakes.
It is not too late to begin to exhaustively review our security strategies, especially our handling of intelligence. Our security agencies should turn a new leaf. A stitch in time, they say, saves nine!
– Achi, former Associate Editor, THISDAY; LEADERSHIP on SUNDAY, is a public issues analyst
