By Alex Ter Adum
Since the president forwarded the Bill to the Senate for the establishment of State Police and it was immediately passed under one sitting, it has elicited mixed feelings of excitement and anxiety in many quarters. The debate over the propriety of State Police in Nigeria, however, has been a long standing conversation long before the hurried passage of the bill by the Senate yesterday. But while the case for State Police in a federal system is compelling, Nigerians should resist the temptation to celebrate constitutional amendments before carefully examining their scope, limitations, and likely impact on the country’s current security challenges.
The first question that must be asked is simple: what problem is the State Police intended to solve?
Under the proposed constitutional amendment, State Police are principally empowered to enforce state laws and maintain law and order within their jurisdictions. A structural arrangement that is ordinarily perfect for a federal system of government. However, Nigeria’s most severe security threats today are terrorism, insurgency, banditry, transnational organized crime, arms trafficking, and large-scale kidnapping networks. These are fundamentally federal crimes governed by federal legislation, including the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act and other federal criminal statutes.
Consequently, responsibility for investigating, prosecuting, and dismantling these criminal enterprises remains largely vested in federal institutions. This raises a fundamental question: if terrorism, banditry, and insurgency remain federal offences, how does State Police address the country’s most pressing security crisis?
The answer is that State Police, by themselves, cannot.
What State Police can do is address a structural defect in Nigeria’s security architecture, the excessive centralization of policing in a country of over 200 million people, 36 states and the FCT, and 776 local government areas, thousands of communities, and enormous cultural and geographical diversity.
The challenge before Nigeria is therefore not merely the creation of State Police but the redesign of an integrated federal-state security architecture capable of addressing both structural and operational deficiencies.
Nigeria should learn from successful federations.
In the United States, local police departments, county sheriffs, state police agencies, and federal agencies such as the FBI operate within clearly defined constitutional and statutory frameworks. Terrorism, interstate criminal networks, and federal offences remain under federal jurisdiction, while local police provide intelligence, first-response capabilities, and community engagement.
In Germany, the Länder police forces handle most day-to-day policing, while the Federal Criminal Police Office coordinates national security threats, terrorism investigations, and inter-state criminal activities.
In Canada, provincial police services operate alongside the federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police under clearly defined jurisdictional arrangements.
In all these federations, decentralization is, however, accompanied by strong institutions, independent oversight mechanisms, constitutional safeguards, and seamless operational coordination.
Nigeria must do the same.
First, every state should operate under a democratically enacted State Constitution defining the powers, limitations, oversight mechanisms, and accountability structures of all state institutions. No governor should possess unilateral authority over an armed police force. Such constitutions should establish State Councils of State composed of former governors, deputy governors, chief judges, speakers of state assemblies, and other distinguished citizens capable of providing institutional checks on executive excesses.
Secondly, the appointment of State Police Commissioners should not be the exclusive prerogative of governors. Commissioners should emerge from a professional pool of federal police service recommended by the Federal Police Service Commission and be subject to confirmation by State Houses of Assembly and State Councils of State. Removal should be governed by strict constitutional procedures that also limit the governor’s unilateralism.
Thirdly, Nigeria should establish a National Policing Standards Commission empowered to regulate recruitment standards, training curricula, operational protocols, forensic procedures, intelligence management, human rights compliance, and professional ethics across all federal and state policing institutions and command.
Fourth, a constitutionally entrenched Federal Police Ombudsman should be established and insulated from political interference. Comprising retired police officers, jurists, academics, civil society representatives, media professionals, and religious leaders, it should possess binding disciplinary authority over all police formations in Nigeria. Its powers should include independent investigations, subpoena powers, disciplinary recommendations, compensation awards, and referrals for criminal prosecution.
Fifth, operational synergy must be constitutionally guaranteed. State Police should serve as the primary providers of community intelligence, neighbourhood policing, rural patrols, and first-response services. Federal agencies should retain jurisdiction over terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, border security, cybercrime, arms trafficking, and inter-state criminal enterprises. Intelligence-sharing platforms, joint task forces, interoperable communication systems, and unified criminal databases should be mandatory.
Sixth, recruitment into State Police should reflect local knowledge while preventing ethnic monopolization. Indegeneship requirements may be desirable, but constitutional safeguards must ensure that minorities and other ethnic residents within states are also adequately represented. A police force perceived as the armed wing of the dominant ethnic or political group would undermine public confidence and national cohesion.
Seventh, the deployment of State Police during elections, political rallies, labour disputes, and inter-party conflicts should be governed by stringent constitutional restrictions. Electoral security should remain under joint federal-state supervision to prevent governors from weaponizing State Police against political opponents.The jurisdiction of federal police should supersede that of State Police in the provision of security for the conduct of elections.
Eighth, specialized courts and independent prosecutors should be established to ensure the swift adjudication of police misconduct, electoral intimidation, unlawful detention, torture, and other violations of fundamental rights.
Ninth, fiscal safeguards are essential. State Police cannot succeed if officers become victims of irregular salaries, inadequate equipment, poor training, and political patronage. Constitutional provisions should establish minimum funding standards and independent auditing mechanisms.
Finally, genuine local government autonomy, legislative independence, fiscal transparency, and a clearer separation of powers must precede the operationalization of State Police. The experience of State Independent Electoral Commissions offers a cautionary lesson. Institutions established to deepen federalism frequently became instruments for manufacturing predetermined outcomes, reducing electoral competition and undermining public confidence in democratic governance.
Without these safeguards, State Police may merely transfer the dangers of centralized policing from Abuja to thirty-six state capitals. But if properly designed, State Police can become part of a broader constitutional restructuring that strengthens local security, improves intelligence gathering, enhances accountability, and creates a cooperative federal security system capable of confronting both ordinary crime and national security threats.
True federalism is not merely the devolution of power. It is the constitutional distribution of power among competing institutions, each constrained by law, oversight, and accountability. State Police should therefore not be viewed as an end in itself but as one component of a comprehensive constitutional redesign aimed at building a safer, more democratic, and more effective Nigerian federation.
Thank you
*Alex Ter Adum, PhD*
*DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE*
alexadum45@gmail.com
