By Jacob Edi
There is something about the geography of Kogi State that makes its security a matter of national consequence.
Situated at the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers, Kogi is more than a geographical landmark on Nigeria’s map. It is a strategic corridor linking the northern and southern parts of the country, making the state a vital gateway for commerce, transportation and national integration.
But geography, like power, comes with its own contradictions. What makes Kogi economically strategic also makes it security-sensitive. Its extensive road networks, forests, rural settlements and boundaries with neighbouring states create a complex operational environment that criminal elements can exploit for mobility, concealment and escape.
Consequently, a security breach in Kogi is rarely just a local inconvenience. Its implications can extend along the same corridors that sustain national commerce and connect communities across the country.
It is against this strategic backdrop that the security leadership of Governor Ahmed Usman Ododo deserves closer examination.
When Ododo assumed office in January 2024, kidnapping and other violent crimes had imposed a heavy burden on communities, motorists, farmers, students and businesses. The payment of ransom had become an alarming feature of the insecurity debate, threatening to normalise the idea that citizens must negotiate their freedom with armed criminals.
It was a disturbing situation in which fear risked becoming an organising principle of everyday life.
Ododo came into office determined to change that equation.
An accountant by training, he appears to have brought into governance the temperament of a man accustomed to scrutinising records, tracing discrepancies and insisting that every figure must reconcile. In the hands of a less determined administrator, such a disposition might have remained confined to ledgers, balance sheets and public expenditure.
In Ododo’s case, however, it offers a compelling metaphor for the business of security: identify the weaknesses, trace the networks, block the channels of support and pursue the problem until the system begins to yield results.
If criminality operates as an enterprise, its supply lines, intelligence networks, mobility routes and operational sanctuaries must be subjected to the same relentless scrutiny as a suspicious account.
This is where the civilian general begins to emerge.
FROM DECLARATIONS TO OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
Ododo’s approach has combined political resolve with investments in the operational capacity of security agencies.
In April 2024, his administration introduced the Metropolitan Quick Response initiative to strengthen rapid intervention and intelligence gathering. The objective was to improve the ability of security personnel to respond to threats before they escalated and reinforce the protection of lives and property.
Then came the tragedy at the Confluence University of Science and Technology, Osara.
The abduction of students from the institution in May 2024 was a sobering test of Kogi State’s security architecture. It exposed the vulnerability of educational institutions to organised criminal attacks and underscored the urgency of strengthening intelligence gathering, rapid response and inter-agency cooperation.
The incident triggered rescue operations involving security agencies, local hunters and other operational partners. The state government subsequently announced the recovery of abducted students over successive days.
The episode was a painful reminder of the enormity of the security challenge. Yet the mobilisation of personnel and resources to locate and rescue the victims demonstrated the importance of a government prepared to deploy its capabilities in defence of its citizens.
For Ododo, the broader lesson was unmistakable: security cannot be managed solely through emergency responses after an attack has occurred. It requires preparation, intelligence, equipment, coordination and the capacity to sustain operations long after the immediate headlines have faded.
That conviction soon found expression in concrete interventions.
In July 2024, the administration distributed security gadgets to 1,050 hunters, recognising the strategic value of local knowledge in tracking criminal elements through difficult terrain.
By October of the same year, the government announced the distribution of a second batch of 100 operational vehicles to security agencies. The investments were intended to improve mobility, extend operational reach and strengthen the capacity of security personnel to respond to threats across vulnerable communities.
The significance of these interventions lies not merely in the number of gadgets or vehicles procured. It lies in the philosophy behind them: those entrusted with protecting the people must be adequately equipped to discharge that responsibility.
Security personnel cannot be expected to confront well-armed criminal groups effectively if they lack the mobility, equipment and logistical support required to operate in difficult terrain.
DISMANTLING THE CRIMINAL NETWORKS
The administration’s determination has also been reflected in subsequent operations against kidnapping networks.
In December 2024, the government announced the arrest of four suspected kidnappers and the rescue of ten victims following a joint operation involving the police and a private security outfit engaged by the state.
In June 2025, security agencies reportedly apprehended 26 suspects during an operation around Bunu Forest in Kabba-Bunu Local Government Area.
Investigations subsequently extended to alleged collaborators and suppliers suspected of supporting criminal gangs in parts of Kogi West.
This is an important dimension of the security challenge that Ododo’s administration appears to recognise.
The fight against kidnapping cannot end with the pursuit of armed men in the forests. Criminal networks depend on information, transportation, food supplies, weapons, ammunition and local collaborators. Without these support systems, their operations become considerably more difficult to sustain.
Disrupting these networks is therefore essential to weakening the machinery that makes kidnapping possible.
In this regard, the administration’s reported operations point to an effort to confront not only the visible perpetrators of violence but also the structures that sustain their activities.
The strategy is significant because lasting security requires more than the arrest of individual suspects. It demands sustained intelligence gathering, thorough investigations, effective prosecution and the dismantling of the networks that enable criminal organisations to regroup.
The challenge, of course, is to ensure that arrests translate into successful prosecutions and that operational gains are consolidated into lasting improvements in public safety.
ARMOUR, FIREPOWER AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Ododo has continued to reinforce the operational capacity of the state’s security architecture.
In December 2025, the government reported the recovery of a substantial cache of weapons and ammunition. In June 2026, it announced the procurement of armoured security vehicles, including an order for 50 vehicles, with initial deliveries and deployments.
Further announcements in July referred to additional deliveries, repaired vehicles and increased operational capacity. The commissioning of the Police Violent Crime Response Unit in Lokoja also added an institutional dimension to the administration’s security investments.
Taken together, these measures represent an effort to improve the mobility, protection and operational effectiveness of security personnel confronting heavily armed criminal groups.
For a state with Kogi’s geographical exposure, such investments are important. Security personnel must be able to move quickly, operate safely and sustain pressure on criminal elements even in remote locations.
Armoured vehicles, however, are only one component of an effective security system. Their impact ultimately depends on reliable intelligence, adequate personnel, maintenance, training, operational coordination and the capacity to deploy them where they are most needed.
The broader test is whether these investments can translate into safer communities, more secure highways and a measurable reduction in the frequency and impact of criminal attacks.
THE POWER OF JOINT OPERATIONS
The governor’s approach has also placed considerable emphasis on rescue operations and cooperation among security agencies.
In July 2026, four abducted persons were reportedly rescued following a coordinated operation after an attack at an examination centre in Olowa, Dekina Local Government Area.
At the end of August, security forces reportedly rescued 21 kidnapped victims in another operation in Dekina. The operation involved the Nigerian Army, the police, the Department of State Services, local hunters and vigilante groups.
These operations underscore the value of a security architecture in which conventional security agencies and community-based actors work together towards a common objective.
The military brings specialised operational capabilities. The police contribute their law-enforcement responsibilities. Intelligence agencies help identify threats and trace criminal networks, while local hunters and vigilante groups offer familiarity with the terrain and surrounding communities.
The governor’s responsibility is to provide the political leadership, coordination and enabling environment required to bring these capabilities together.
When these different strengths converge around a shared objective, the prospects for effective intervention improve considerably.
Yet cooperation must be sustained beyond individual rescue missions. Intelligence sharing, clear operational responsibilities, respect for the rule of law and accountability are essential to ensuring that joint operations deliver lasting security benefits.
The objective must not merely be to rescue victims after they have been abducted. It must also be to prevent attacks, protect vulnerable communities and make the business of kidnapping increasingly difficult and unprofitable.
THE NO-RANSOM POSITION
There is another defining feature of Ododo’s public security posture: his repeated declaration that his administration will neither negotiate with kidnappers nor pay ransom to criminal elements.
The significance of this position extends beyond rhetoric. It communicates an unwillingness to allow armed groups to dictate the terms of public authority and reinforces the administration’s stated preference for strengthening security operations rather than treating ransom payments as the inevitable price of freedom.
It also speaks to a wider concern about the emergence of individuals who profit from insecurity, including those who exploit the desperation of victims’ families and the weaknesses of the security system.
Such individuals might aptly be described as securitypreneurs—people who turn the business of insecurity, or the promise of resolving it, into an avenue for personal gain.
However, a no-ransom policy must be accompanied by effective rescue operations, reliable intelligence and sustained protection for vulnerable communities. Families confronted with the abduction of loved ones require practical assurances that every lawful effort is being made to secure their safe return.
The ultimate objective must be to deny criminal groups the financial incentives that sustain kidnapping while ensuring that victims are not abandoned to their fate.
In a climate where the fear of abduction can paralyse economic activity and weaken public confidence, Ododo’s position carries political and psychological significance.
It signals that his administration intends to reclaim the initiative.
A MODEL FOR WIDER SECURITY COOPERATION?
Ododo’s emerging security profile has also generated a wider policy conversation, with calls for other states in northern Nigeria to study aspects of Kogi’s approach.
Such interest is understandable. Insecurity does not respect state boundaries, and the experience of one state can provide useful lessons for another, particularly in intelligence gathering, operational mobility, community participation and inter-agency cooperation.
The objective should not be to replicate every component of Kogi’s security architecture mechanically. Different states face different threats, geographical conditions and operational constraints.
Rather, the task is to identify principles that can be adapted to different environments: decisive leadership, adequately equipped security personnel, intelligence-led operations, the disruption of criminal support networks and the willingness to sustain pressure on violent groups.
There is also a compelling case for stronger cooperation among neighbouring states. Criminal elements can exploit jurisdictional boundaries, moving from one state to another to evade arrest or establish new operational bases.
No state can therefore achieve lasting security in isolation. Information sharing, coordinated operations and effective collaboration among federal, state and local security structures remain indispensable.
These are lessons with relevance beyond Kogi.
For Ododo, however, the immediate responsibility remains the protection of his people and the preservation of Kogi’s strategic position as a national gateway.
Every criminal network disrupted, every victim rescued and every improvement in operational capacity contributes to that larger objective.
THE CIVILIAN GENERAL
The description “civilian general” is not a reference to military uniforms or the command of troops. It is a metaphor for a civilian leader who has chosen to place the authority of his office, the resources of government and the machinery of the state behind the pursuit of public safety.
Ododo’s security interventions suggest a governing philosophy in which the fight against criminality is not treated as an occasional spectacle or a ceremonial declaration. It is presented as a continuing exercise in preparedness, coordination, intelligence and resolve.
But the ultimate measure of any security strategy is not the number of vehicles procured, the volume of weapons recovered or the frequency of government announcements. It is the extent to which ordinary people can live, work, travel, farm, study and conduct their businesses without the persistent fear of violence.
That is the standard against which the administration’s interventions must ultimately be judged.
The challenge ahead is to sustain the momentum, consolidate operational gains and ensure that arrests lead to prosecution, rescued victims receive the necessary support, and communities experience lasting improvements in safety.
It is equally important to strengthen preventive intelligence, protect vulnerable institutions and ensure that security operations remain professional, accountable and respectful of the rights of citizens.
Insecurity must not be allowed to become a permanent condition of public life. Nor should criminal groups be permitted to believe that the state will eventually surrender the initiative.
For a state that serves as a gateway between Nigeria’s regions, securing Kogi is also a contribution to protecting the country’s vital corridors of movement and commerce.
The task before Ododo is clear: to translate operational investments and political resolve into enduring public confidence, safer communities and a security environment in which criminality is increasingly difficult to sustain.
The civilian general has taken the lead. The enduring test will be whether that leadership delivers lasting security for the people of Kogi State.
